Abstract. Recently . Since the solution is very efficient, i.e., 0 ( l p l 3 ) , the Semaev-Smart-Satoh-Araki (SSSA) algorithm implies the possibility of realizing a trapdoor for the discrete logarithm problem, and we have tried to utilize the SSSA algorithm for constructing a cryptographic scheme. One of our trials was to realize an identity-based cryptosystem (key-distribution) which has been proven to be as secure as a primitive problem, called the Diffie-Hellman problem on an elliptic curve over Z/nZ (n = p q , p and q are primes) where Ep and E, are anomalous curves (anomalous En-Diffie-Hellman problem). Unfortunately we have found that the anomalous En-Diffie-Hellman problem is not secure (namely, our scheme is not secure). First, this paper introduces our trial of realizing an identity-based cryptosystem based on the SSSA algorithm, and then shows why the anomalous En-Diffie-Hellman problem is not secure. In addition, we generalize the observation of our breaking algorithm and present reductions of factoring n to computing the order' of an elliptic curve over Z / n Z . (These reductions roughly imply the equivalence of intractability between factoring and computing elliptic curve's order.) The algorithm of breaking our identity-based cryptosystem is considered to be a special case of these reductions, and the essential reason why our system was broken can be clarified through these reductions: En in our system is a very specific curve such that the order of En (i.e., n) is trivially known.
Introduction

Background
One of the most interesting open problems in cryptography is the realization of a trapdoor on the discrete logarithm, in which to solve the discrete logarithm is hard only if published parameters are used, while it is easy by using a secret key (trapdoor key).
One of the possible candidates to solve the problem is: a pair of primes, ( p , q ) , is a secret key, and n = pq is the corresponding public-key. (1) the discrete logarithm modn is intractable against an adversary who knows no factors of n and (2) a person who knows a trapdoor, ( p , q ) , can compute the discrete logarithm modn efficiently.
However, this trapdoor trick does not seem to work well. This is because: in order to make the trapdoor for computing the discrete logarithm modn efficiently (i.e., to make the discrete logarithm modp be easy), p -1 should consist of all (fairly) small primes. Such n is (fairly) easily factored by the p -1 method. Of course, we can make some delicate computational complexity gap between computing the discrete logarithm mod p and factoring n [7, 81, but it seems hard to make a computationally feasible gap such that one is a polynomial time and the other an (assumed) super-polynomial time.
1.2
The discrete logarithm problem can be defined on various finite groups as well as the multiplicative group over a finite field F,. A typical example except the multiplicative group is the discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curves over F,, and many cryptographic schemes are constructed on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problems.
Recently an efficient solution of the discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curves over F, with p points ( p : prime), so-called anomalous curves, was independently discovered by Semaev [14] , Smart [17] , and Satoh and Araki [12] . The solution is very efficient, i.e., O(lp13), and is almost as efficient as typical practical public-key encryption and decryption algorithms such as those of the RSA scheme. The Semaev-Smart-Satoh-Araki (SSSA) algorithm, therefore, implies the possibility of realizing a trapdoor for the discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curves over Z / n Z , (say En) where En is the Chinese remainder composition of anomalous elliptic curves, E, and E,. Here, the discrete logarithm over En seems hard without knowing ( p , q ) , while if the trapdoor information ( p , q ) is known, it can be easily calculated by using the SSSA algorithm for E, and E,.
New hope: anomalous elliptic curves
Identity-based cryptosystems
We have tried to utilize this trapdoor trick based on the Semaev-Smart-SatohAraki (SSSA) algorithm for realizing a cryptographic scheme. One of our trials was to realize an identity-based cryptosystem (key-distribution).
In 1984, Shamir proposed a new concept, identity-based cryptosystem, to solve the authentication problem of standard public-key cryptosystems [15] . Here the authentication problem is: a public-key file managed by a trusted authority or authority's certificates of public-keys should be employed in order to check the validity of public-keys (i.e., to check the correct linkage between a public-key and a user).
In the identity-based cryptosystem, there exits an authority, who generates users' secret keys by using users's identities and the authority's secret key, and distributes them to users through secure channels. When user A with A's secret key, S A , wants to send a ciphertext to B , user A encrypts the message, m, into a ciphertext, c , using B's identity, I D B , and S A , in place of B's public-key. Since B's identity can be assumed to be publicly known (i.e., to be known by A), such an identity-based cryptosystem does not require A to interact with any party to get information regarding B (e.g., B's public-key) when A sends a ciphertext to B (i.e., A needs no interaction with any party, after A gets S A from the authority), while B's public-key should be transmitted to A through a public-key file or directly from B , in the standard public-key cryptosystems.
Note that the security of identity-based cryptosystems depends much more on the security of the authority than the standard public-key cryptosystems, since the authority knows all users' secret keys.
Although Shamir gave a concrete realization of identity-based digital signature schemes, he left it open as to how to realize identity-based cryptosystems (or identity-based key-distributions). Several schemes have been proposed regarding this problem, but no satisfactory solution to Shamir's open problem has been proposed so far.
Trial
We obtained a solution to this open problem, by using the trapdoor technique based on anomalous elliptic curves. The identity-based cryptosystem (keydistribution) has the following properties:
-This scheme has no interahon and no threshold of collusion (i.e., truly follows Shamir's concept). -The required computational power for the authority is feasible, i.e., O(1nI3)
per one user key generation. -The security assumption is clear and feasible: the security of the system is reduced to the intractability of a reasonable primitive problem, the anomalous En-Diffie-Hellman problem, under the random oracle model .
A rough idea of our system is as follows: R and (parameters of) En are the public system parameters and ( p , q ) is the secret of the authority, who can compute the discrete logarithm, S A , using the SSSA algorithm, where I D A is the identity of user A , G and F ( I D A ) are points on En (i.e., F is a function to embed I D A to a point on En) and SAG = F ( I D A ) . The authority sends S A to user A secretly, and A can compute a shared key, K A B , with user B by using S A and
F ( I D B ) such that K A B = S A F ( I D B ) = S A ( S B G ) = S B ( S A G ) = S B F ( I D A ) .
Therefore, B can also compute the same key, K A B , from S B and F ( I D A ) . Here note that the authority with secret-key ( p , q ) can compute S A efficiently (with running time of O( IpI')) using the SSSA algorithm, while it is considered to be hard to compute it without knowing ( p , q ) .
Failure
Unfortunately we have found that the anomalous En-Diffie-Hellman problem is not secure (namely, our scheme is not secure). We have also found an another example of insecure cryptosystems based on anomalous curves. We will observe why the anomalous En-Diffie-Hellman problem is not secure and why it is hard to utilize anomalous curves for realizing a secure cryptographic scheme.
Reductions
Through the observation on our algorithm of breaking the anomalous En-DiffieHellman problem and on the reason why it is hard t o utilize anomalous curves for constructing secure cryptographic schemes, we have realized a relationship between the breaking algorithm and some reductions.
For this purpose, we will show reductions of factoring n to computing the order of an elliptic curve over Z/nZ. (See the footnote in Abstract for the meaning of "order" .) These reductions roughly imply the equivalence of intractability between factoring and computing elliptic curve's order. Here, the algorithm of breaking our ID-based cryptosystem is considered to be a special case of these reductions, since the order of En in our identity-based cryptosystem (i.e., in the anomalous En-Diffie-Hellman problem) is trivial, i.e., n. The reductions imply that factoring n is trivially easy if and only if the order of En is trivially obtained.
We will show two types of reductions: one (Reduction 1) is the reduction of the elliptic curve factoring problem (Le., given ( E n , n ) , factoring n ) to computing the order of an elliptic curve over Z/nZ; the other (Reduction 2) is the reduction of the fuclorzng problem (given n , factoring n ) to computing the order of an elliptic curve over Z/nZ.
In Reduction 1, we assume that En is selected under the condition that # E p and # E , have large prime factors. (Note that n can be trivially factored from En if either # E p or #h', has only small prime factors.) The cryptographic implication of this reduction is: When En is selected by a key generator of a cryptographic scheme (i.e., the key generator checks whether # E p and # E as the elliptic curve factoring problem. On the other hand, in Reduction 2, we assume that En is randomly selected from a non-negligible fraction of elliptic curves over Z/nZ. The cryptographic implication of this reduction is: When En is randomly selected from a non-negligible fraction, computing the order of En, given (En, n ) , is as hard as the factoring problem.
If En is selected under special cryptographic conditions (or selected from a negligible fraction of elliptic curves over Z/nZ), then only Reduction 1 works, but gives no reduction from the factoring problem. Since En for our ID-based cryptosystem ( E p and E , are anomalous) is specific (i.e., is selected from a negligible fraction), the breaking algorithm is a special case of Reduction 1, but not of Reduction 2.
Remark (Related Works)
Miller and Long showed the reduction of factoring n to computing the Euler function 4(n) [9, 61. Kunihiro and Koyama have recently presented the reduction (say the "KK reduction") of the factoring problem to computing the order of an elliptic curve, En, over Z/nZ [ 5 ] . Hence our Reduction 2 corresponds to the K K reduction. In addition Reduction 1 corresponds to the reduction as a variant of the KK reduction described in Remarks (3), in [ 5 ] . Both the KK reduction and our Reduction 2 work for non-negligible fractions of # E n . The difference between these reductions are the failure cases of reduction. The K K reduction does not work when the order of #En has only large prime factors, while our Reduction 2 works for any non-negligible fractions. On the other hand, our Reduction 2 does not consider the case where n has more than two prime factors, while the KK reduction carefully considers such a case. Therefore, for some cases the KK reduction works while our Reduction 2 does not work, and for the other cases our Reduction 2 works while the KK reduction does not work. This difference depends on the underlying techniques in the reductions: x-coordinate addition formula and twist curve technique play essential roles in our Reductions 1 and have large prime factors), computing the order of En, given (E,,n), is as har 8 0 L.
Algorithm Anomalous Elliptic Curves and the Discrete Logarithm
This section introduces the underlying key techniques and notations employed in our scheme: anomalous elliptic curves, the SSSA algorithm, elliptic curves over Z/nZ, and the addition formula for z-coordinates.
Anomalous Elliptic Curves
Let K be a finite field with characteristics # 2 , 3 . The set forms a finite Abelian group, and the group law formula [16] (usually we call it the addition, and use the notation +) is defined over the points on I<.
Let p be a prime ( p > 5), and F, be a finite field with p elements. Now, let An efficient way to find the parameters of an anomalous elliptic curve over a prime field has been shown by [lo].
#E(F,) be the number of points on E(F,), and #E(F ) =
2.2
Very recently, Semaev [14], Smart [17] and Satoh and Araki [12] independently discovered an efficient (0( lp13) algorithm for computing the discrete logarithm for anomalous elliptic curve E(F,).
Definition 1. Let E(F,)
be an anomalous elliptic curve, and G, P be points on E(F,). Given, G, P , and E(F,), the discrete logarithm problem over E(F,) is to find integer m (0 5 m < p ) such that P = mG.
Discrete Logarithm Algorithm of Anomalous Elliptic Curves
Although Semaev's algorithm has a different flavor from the algorithm by Smart, Satoh, and Araki, in this paper we introduce Smart-Satoh-Araki's approach and call it the SSSA algorithm as follows (we mainly follow the notations 
Let A E ,~ be non-zero. Compute XE,~(G) and X E~~( P ) . (The computational complexity of computing A E~~ ( G ) is O( lpI3).) Compute s = X E ,~ ( P ) / X E~, ( G )
modp.
[Computation of non-zero map A, , , ]
Input:
3 . Compute XEpZ(a) as follows:
Addition Formula with 2-coordinates
Here we show an addition formula only with 2-coordinates, based on the division polynomials [2] .
For E(F,) ( ( u p , b p ) be the parameters of E ( F p ) ) , P = (xp,yp), and (i*z,,i*
Elliptic Curves over the Ring
An addition formula with x-coordinates on E ( Z / n Z ) can be also defined in the same way as the addition formula on E(Fp). Hence, given x E Z / n Z with [Pp,PqI = ~(~p , Y p ) 1 ( " q r Y q ) l 1 where pp E E P p ) and p E E(F,)! 2 = [ 2 p , Z I 1 3 The Proposed Non-interactive Identity-Based Key-Distribution Scheme
The Proposed Scheme
The proposed system consists of the trusted authority, T, and users, A , B etc.. Authority T generates T's secret-key, s T , and publishes system public parameters. (mod q ) > .
Therefore, the public and secret parameters are as follows: 
G ' ( l k ) + ( n , E ( Z / n Z ) , XG,), ( n , E ( Z /~Z ) , X G , )
is public system parameters (with the same distribution of the proposed scheme), and k = 1711. Let IDA and I DB be given.
Let Adw be an adversary of the proposed scheme. Adw provides arbitrary The proposed scheme is secure if, for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary, Adw, for any constant c, for all sufficiently large k ,
P~[ A~~(~, E ( Z /~Z ) , X G , , I D A , I D~, (~~,~~) , . . .
, ( s I ,~I ) )
The probability is taken over the coin flips of G', random oracle h, and Adw. 
Anomalous En-Diffie-Hellman Problem is Tractable
Now we show that the anomalous E,-Diffie-Hellman problem is tractable. More precisely, given ( n , En), there is an efficient algorithm to factor n.
Let Ep and E, be anomalous elliptic curves such that En 
X is the z-coordinate of a point on [E,, E,].
Then n * X is a finite value (i.e., [a finite value , a finite value I). In cases 2 and 3, n * X can be used for factor n, while n * X cannot be used for factor n in cases 1 and 4. That is, in cases 2 and 3, gcd(d, n ) should be p or q, where d be the denominator of n * X.
Hence, given (n,E(Z/nZ)), if X is randomly selected from Z/nZ, n can be factored with probability 1/2. By repeating this procedure many (poly((n1)) times, the success probability of factoring n is overwhelming.
Another Trial and Failure
We can easily construct an elliptic curve version of a public-key cryptosystem [ll] . Here, [ll] is constructed on the multiplicative group over ring Z/nZ ( n = p2q; p , q : primes), while the elliptic curve version is constructed on elliptic curves, E n , over ring Z/nZ ( n = pp; p , q : primes), En = [Ep, E,], Ep is anomalous elliptic curve over Fp and E, is not an anomalous elliptic curve over F,. The pSylow group in [ll] corresponds to the anomalous curve, E p .
Obviously n can be easily factored from the parameter of En in a manner similar t o Section 4 (see Appendix B for the related reductions).
Reductions
Through the observation on our algorithm of breaking the anomalous En-DiffieHellman problem and on the reason why it is hard to utilize anomalous curves for constructing secure cryptographic schemes, we have realized a relationship between the breaking algorithm and some reductions.
For this purpose, this section will show two reductions (Reductions 1 and 2) of factoring n to computing the order of an elliptic curve over Z/nZ.
We will also show other reduct.ions which are related to the attack introduced in Section 5 in Appendix B.
The algorithms of our reductions are based on the algorithm of breaking our identity cryptosystem (i.e., the anomalous En-Diffie-Hellman problem). Hence this section follows the notations and techniques of Section 4 and the previous sections (e.g., for the twist curve of elliptic curve E p , and * for the elliptic curve addition operation with only z-coordinates).
Definition6. Let GI be an instance generator such that Gl(lk) + n , n = p q , In1 = k, ( p , q : primes, (pl = [pi), where p and q are independently selected. The "factoring problem" is, given (n, k ) by GI, to find ( p , p).
The factoring problem is intractable, if for any probabilistic polynomial time machine Adv, for any constant c, for sufficiently large k,
The probability is taken over the coin flips of G1 and Adw.
Definition7. Let G2 be an instance generator such that G2(lk) --+ (En,n),
( E , and E , are elliptic curves over F, and F,, respectively). Here p and q are independently selected.
The "elliptic curve factoring problem" is, given (En, n , k) by Gz, to find
The elliptic curve factoring problem is intractable, if for any probabilistic (Pl q ) .
polynomial time machine Adv, for any constant c , for sufficiently large k ,
The probability is taken over the coin flips of G2 and Adv.
Definition8. Let G3 be an instance generator such that Ga(lk) --+ (En,n),
Here, p and q are independently selected.
The "elliptic curve order problem" is, given (En, n , k ) , to find @(En), where
The elliptic curve order problem is intractable, if for any probabilistic poly-@(En) = Icm(#Ep, #E,).
nomial time machine Adv, for any constant c , for sufficiently large k ,
The probability is taken over the coin flips of G3 and Adv. 
Proof. (Only i f )
Assume that the elliptic curve factoring problem is not intractable. That is, an adversary, Adv, given (En, n , k ) , can factor n with non-negligible probability. We will then construct a polynomial time machine M with help of Adv (with knowing ( p , q ) ) , which, given (En, n , k), computes @(En) with non-negligible probability. M obtains elliptic curves Ep and E, such that En = [EP,Eq]. M computes # E p , # E , with using Schoof's algorithm [13] , whose running time is of the order of polynomial. So, M A d v can compute @(En) = Icm(#E,,#E,) with non-negligible probability.
Let assume that the elliptic curve order problem is not intractable. That is, an adversary, Adv, can compute @(En) from ( E n , n , k ) with non-negligible probability. We will then construct a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm M , with help of Adv as an oracle, which, given (En,n1k), can factor n with non-negligible probability.
When M randomly selects z E Z/nZ, (y) = -1 with probability 1/2, where f denotes a cubic polynomial which defines the elliptic curve En = [E,, E,] and (%) the Jacobi symbol.
Then we have two possibilities: z is the 2-coordinate of a point on [ E p l E q ] and is the 2-coordinate of a point on [Ep, E 4 ] , where Eq (and E,) is the twist of E, (and E p ) [2] , and #E, = q + l + s (and #Ep = p + l + t ) when # E , = q+1-s (and #Ep = p + 1 -t ) . Without loss of generality, we assume that the first case occurs.
Since the distribution of ( E n , n , k ) is given by G3 = G2, Adv can output a correct @(En) with non-negligible probability.
Let a = gcd (q + 1 -s, q + 1 + s) , ab = q + 1 + s, then, it is easy to see that q' ]q + 1 + s, a 5 4fi. On the other hand, since p' ]q + 1 + s with overwhelming probability over the distribution of p', a is a divisor of 'u.
1
I
Hence, w e h a v e a < q 4 a n d g c d ( p + 1 -t , b ) = g c d ( u I b ) < q 4 .
In order to evaluate the probability of the case when @(En) * z is the 2-coordinate of [ U p , U,], it is sufficient to consider the point of a gcd(u, b) * z .
Let the maximum order of a point on E,(F,)\H, be o,,,.
Then, om,, is at least d(q + 1 + s ) -# H a due to the group structure of elliptic curve, where H , denotes the set of a-torsion points of Eq(F,). Since # H a 5 a 2 , we obtain Obviously, ,/(q + 1 + s) -Jii 2 d m f i > q t , so we have om,, > q : . Now, if we choose z randomly such that z, = z mod q is not the z-coordinate of point H , and has order o,,,, then agcd(b,u) * z is the z-coordinate of [ U p , a finite value]. We will then evaluate the probability that a randomly selected point, z,, is not the x-coordinate of a point H , and has order om,,.
It is easy to see that there are (~(o,,,) many points of order o,,,.
Hence the probability that a randomly selected point, z q , is not the x-coordinate of a Hence, M selects polynomially many .z randomly, for at least one of them, , @(En) * z is the 2-coordinate of a point, [ U p , a finite value], with overwhelming probability.
Thus, M can factor n with help of Adv with non-negligible probability. Let assume that the elliptic curve order problem is not intractable, so, there exists an adversary, Adv, which can compute @(En) from ( E n , n , k ) with nonnegligible probability. Then we will construct a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm M , with help of Adv as an oracle, which, given n by G I , can factor n with non-negligible probability.
M uniformly selects an elliptic curve modn, En, and randomly chooses z E Z l n Z , then ($) = -1 with probability 1/2 (see the proof of Theorem 9 for the notations o f f and (y)). First we investigate the maximum size of a square factor of #E,. Lei Therefore, if l z > e log k for any constant e and for sufficiently large k (i.e., 2'2 is super-polynomial), then T is negligible in k . Therefore, Id1 = e log k for constant e with overwhelming probability.
Let the maximum order of a point on Eq be q9. Then, ~~/ a is at least b/d due to the group structure of elliptic curve.
We will then evaluate the probability that b/d divides # E = ( p + 1 -t ) . In 
which is negligible in k .
of a point, [Op,a finite valuef, for a point, z , such that z, = z mod q has the maximum order on E q . The probability that a randomly selected point , zg , has Hence, when A4 selects polynomially many z randomly, for at least one of them, @(En) * z is the 2-coordinate of a point, [O,, a finite value], with overwhelming probability.
Thus, M can factor R with help of the oracle, Adv, with non-negligible probability.
E ,
the the maximum order is 6 , n , n~+ l + J = O ( W ) .
7 Conclusion
This paper has introduced our trial of realizing an identity-based cryptosystem based on the SSSA algorithm, and then showed that our scheme is not secure.
We have generalized the observation of our breaking algorithm and presented reductions of factoring n to computing the order of an elliptic curve over Z/nZ.
Through these reductions, we can clarify the essential reason why our system was broken: En in our system is a very specific curve such that @(En) is known (@(En) = n ) . 
Appendix B: Another Type of Reductions
Here we will show another type of reductions, which are related to the attack algorithm shown in Section 5. T h a t is, the attack algorithm is a special case of the reductions in this section.
Definitionll. Let G4 be an instance generator such that G4(lk) + ( E , , n ) ,
Here p and q are independently selected.
Let @ ( E p ) = m . # E p , where m is an integer such that gcd(#E,:#E,) # E l m (i.e.,
The modified elliptic curve order problem is, given ( E n , n , k), to find @ ( E p ) .
The modified elliptic curve order problem is intractable, if for any proba- 
@(En) M E P ) ) .
The probability is taken over the coin flips of G4 and A d v . Assume that the modified elliptic curve order problem is intractable. T h a t is, there exists an adversary, A d v , which can compute @ ( E p ) from (En, n , k ) with non-negligible probability. We will then construct a probabilistic polynomial time machine M I with help of A d v as an oracle, which given (En, n , k), can factor n with non-negligible probability.
Since the distribution of (En,n,k) given by Gz is equivalent to that by G4, A d v outputs a correct @ ( E p ) with non-negligible probability.
M randomly selects z E Z/nZ such that (e) = 1 with probability 1/2 (see the proof of Theorem 9 for the notations of f and (*)).
Then Let assume that the modified elliptic curve order problem is not intractable, i.e., there exists an adversary, A d v , which computes @ ( E p ) from (En, n , k) with non-negligible probability.
Then we will construct a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm M , with help of A d v as an oracle, which, given n by G I , can factor n with non-negligible probability.
M uniformly selects an elliptic curve modn, En. Here note that the distribution of En given by M is the same as that given by Gq.
The remaining algorithm for this reduction is the same as that of Reduction 3. Thus, A4 can factor n with help of the oracle, Adv, with non-negligible probability.
